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Abstract. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used for monitoring
and controlling critical infrastructures such as power stations, waste wa-
ter treatment facilities, traffic lights, and many more. Lately, these sys-
tems have become a popular target for cyber attacks. Security is often
an afterthought, leaving them vulnerable to all sorts of attacks.
This article presents a formal approach for analysing the security of
Industrial Control Systems, both during their design phase and while
operational. A knowledge-based system is used to analyse a model of
the control system and extract system vulnerabilities. The approach has
been validated on an ICS in the design phase.
Keywords: Industrial Control Systems Security, Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Formal Modeling, IDP
1 Introduction
The term industrial control system (ICS) can be assigned to a broad range
of applications, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), etc. Typically, an industrial control
system is a network of interacting elements with physical input and output. A
number of field devices containing sensors and actuators are remotely monitored
and controlled from a centralized location [8].
Industrial control systems used to be isolated, proprietary systems. The only
security concern was physical access to the system. With the evolution of IT in
these last decades, this is no longer true. ICS now often consist of Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, and are connected to a company network
and the internet. These changes have made them easier to use, but also more
vulnerable to attacks [2].
Typical IT solutions are not always applicable to these systems. Their crit-
ical nature introduces additional requirements such as high determinism and
response times. Reliability of the network is more important than in most IT
applications. For these reasons, applying patches to fix vulnerabilities is not
always possible, especially if they require a reboot of the system [18]. Patch
management is often an important aspect of maintaining ICS.
Because of the link between the physical environment and the computational
aspect, these systems require unique security mechanisms [15]. The presence of
sensors in the physical environment introduces new communication channels for
attackers which are not usually considered. They no longer have to break into a
computer to compromise the system. Existing security defense mechanisms do
not sufficiently take this into account [20].
Due to their critical nature, attacks on these systems could have disastrous
consequences. Previous attacks on ICS illustrate this. Famous examples are the
Maroochy Shire sewage spill in Australia [1], and the Stuxnet worm in Iran [14].
The former caused 800.000 litres of raw sewage to spill into local parks and
rivers, the latter was used to sabotage the fuel enrichment plant of Natanz in
Iran. [11].
The Stuxnet worm was discovered in 2010. Industrial control system security
has been a popular research topic since. Organisations such as NIST/ISA/ISO
have produced security standards and guidelines for adequately protecting these
systems [17,3,10]. This work presents a tool that performs a security analysis of
an ICS model based on these standards and guidelines. The modeling is done in
the Systems Modeling Language (SysML), while the analysis is done using the
Imperative Declarative Programming (IDP) framework.
Contribution. This article presents a model-based approach for the detec-
tion of vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. In particular, this article
focuses on simulating vulnerabilities or attacks during the design phase of the
ICS. The article includes a case study where this approach has been validated:
an industrial brewery.
The brewery is located on a university campus as part of the chemical de-
partment. Currently it is not connected to the campus network, the operators
have to go down into the brewery and perform all control locally. They would like
this to change so they can remotely operate and monitor the brewing process.
Hence, they are looking for ways to securely connect the brewery to the campus
network. We will investigate three possible architectures to do this, and model
these architectures in our framework to run simulations on them.
In the case study, the control systems are represented as IDP instances. A
logic theory inside the IDP framework then draws conclusions from the model.
This logic has been added to a framework which allows the user to model the
system with SysML, the Systems Modelling Language. The resulting XML file
gets parsed to input that is accepted by the IDP framework. Then the security
evaluation takes place [12].
Outline. The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 details the
methodology and introduces SysML and the IDP system. Section 3 focuses on
the logic framework. We discuss the input model that formally represents the
control system, simulations, and the inferences and queries that are used to
extract system vulnerabilities. In Section 4 we introduce the case study. The
case study is an industrial brewery and here we discuss how our framework fits
into the design phase of ICS. Section 5 reflects on the approach. Finally, Section
6 concludes the article and contains future work.
2 Methodology
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Fig. 1. Framework for extracting vulnerabilities from industrial control systems.
Figure 1 shows the general overview of our approach. First, an industrial
control system is modeled in the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). Then
the model of the system is converted to input for our logic component: the
Imperative Declarative Programming framework (IDP3). There, a logic theory
extracts vulnerabilities from the model. The rules in the logic theory are based
on ICS vulnerability databases and security standards and guidelines. When the
analysis is complete, the conclusions are returned.
SysML is an extension of UML that is used to model systems and systems-
of-systems [7,9]. Currently none of the diagrams in SysML provide a way to
consider system security. A paper by Oates et al. [16] talks about the lack of
system security in Model-Based System Engineering, and in particular in SysML.
In that paper they say that little work is done from the perspective of automat-
ically pulling relevant information from an existing model to highlight security
vulnerabilities. That is what this work aims to achieve. At the end of their paper
they suggest a threat agent diagram, based on the threat-risk relationship from
[10]. When our method finds any vulnerabilities, they can be included in SysML
in a similar diagram.
IDP3 is a state-of-the-art declarative programming system developed at KU
Leuven. It supports reasoning on expressions in a high-level formal language
that extends first-order logic, called “The IDP language”. This language adds
aggregates, partial functions, inductive definitions, etc. to first order logic to
make it easier for users to specify their problem. IDP is used to solve search
problems using, amongst other methods, model expansion [19,4]. The major
strength of the IDP framework is an intuitive input language, which allows us
to model problems fluently. The use of inductive definitions, for example, is very
helpful for modeling transitive closures and other recursive predicates.
3 The Logic Framework
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Fig. 2. A symbolic view of the IDP 3 framework.
Figure 2 shows the components of the logic framework. At the top is the
System Independent Modeling part, containing the Vocabulary and the Theory.
These remain the same for all control systems.
The vocabulary consists of all the types, predicates, and functions that are
used to model the system. It can be subdivided in three parts: the input vocab-
ulary used in the Structure, the reasoning vocabulary used in the theory, and
the output vocabulary used to return the conclusions.
The theory contains the logic rules that will extract the vulnerabilities from
the system. A set of Expansion Rules will first expand the model. Afterwards,
several Queries will be run on the expanded model to draw conclusions about
the security of the system.
The input model, or structure, will vary from system to system. This is where
the actual control system is modeled. We distinguish four parts:
- The ICS Model models the control system. This is further divided in three
areas. First we consider the process specification of the system. Here we list
the parameters that are considered in the system, and the operations that
users are allowed to perform on them (Read, Modify, . . . ). The architecture
lists all the physical components and channels that the system contains.
Finally, security properties are added to the modules. For instance, tokens
are associated with authentication modules to indicate a user needs this
token to access the module.
- The User Model lists the user groups of the system. Each user group is
associated with the credentials they own, and additional predicates are used
to model other properties they may have, such as physical access to certain
components. Attackers are modeled in the same way as users.
- The Policy Specification is a list of permissions that user groups have in
terms of which operations they are allowed to perform on parameters. This
list is provided by the modeler. When the model is fully expanded, queries
will check whether the policy specification is satisfied by the system.
- The Vulnerability Model consists of two parts. The first part contains vulner-
ability databases that will identify component vulnerabilities in the system.
Currently only the ICS-CERT database is included, but the framework al-
lows for other databases to be added in the future. The second part contains
predicates that allow the user to run simulations, this is explained in detail
in Section 3.1.
Once the vocabulary, theory, and structure are filled in, the IDP instance is
complete and is passed to the logic component which performs the analysis. The
conclusions are then returned.
3.1 Simulations
In the test case we focus on simulations and how they can help to incorporate
security in the design phase of industrial control systems.
In order to explain how simulations work, we first have to give a brief in-
troduction to component vulnerabilities and how they are handled in IDP. A
component vulnerability is a vulnerability associated with a specific ICS compo-
nent, for instance a PLC of a certain type and version that is known to have a
buffer overflow vulnerability. These vulnerabilities are extracted using the vul-
nerability databases such as the one from ICS CERT. The ICS CERT database
is managed by the Department of Homeland Security and contains a list of all
ICS components that have reported vulnerabilities. This list is added to our logic
theory in order to identify these vulnerabilities if the associated components are
used in the control system. More details about how this is done can be found at
[12] [13].
Of course when we analyse a system in the design phase, vendor and version
information may not yet be known and another way to introduce component
vulnerabilities must be considered. This is where the simulations enter the story.
For each component vulnerability category, there is a corresponding simulation
predicate that allows a user to flag a component as vulnerable for that specific
category. For instance SimulateDoS(BreweryPLC) flags the PLC as having a
vulnerability that can cause a denial of service.
Other types of simulations can be performed by changing the input model.
For example, we can simulate the scenario where an administrator leaves himself
logged in on a workstation. All unauthorized users who have access to this work-
station are then able to use this with the administrator’s permissions. This can
be simulated by giving these users the administrator’s password. In this fash-
ion, we can include cascading attacks whereby different attackers target various
components. The effect of these combined attacks on the system security is then
investigated.
3.2 Component Vulnerabilities and Queries
Component Vulnerabilities. The component vulnerabilities are grouped in
categories which will be used later. For instance, BufferOverflow, HeapOverflow,
MemoryCorruption, . . . are all vulnerabilities that can cause a Denial of Service.
Hence we can group them together as follows:
∀x[SystemPart] :HasDoSV uln(x)←HasV ulnerability(x,BufferOverflow)
∨ HasV ulnerability(x,HeapOverflow) ∨ . . .
All component vulnerabilities are assigned to one or more categories. Other
categories include Escalation of Privilege, Data Leakage, Bypass of Authentica-
tion, . . . The categories are based on the threats we currently consider in the
system vulnerability rules. How the component vulnerabilities are identified is
explained in Section 3.1.
Queries. The vulnerabilities in the previous section are at the component
level. Having an overview of which components contain vulnerabilities is useful,
but system security as a whole is even more important. A set of rules is present
in the theory which evaluates this, we refer to these as queries.
Once the definitions have completed all the predicates and the model is fully
expanded, it is possible to check whether certain properties hold. A second theory
contains logic rules that do exactly this. These rules are referred to as queries.
Table 1 contains queries that will be referred to throughout this section.
As mentioned, the framework can be used both on operational systems and
systems still in the design phase. The methodology to extract system vulnera-
bilities is largely similar, and the expansion rules and queries used are the same.
The big difference in approach lies in the source of the component vulnerabili-
ties. For operational systems, the component vulnerabilities are identified using
a vulnerability database. When considering systems in the design phase, the
component vulnerabilities are introduced by the designer using simulations.
The queries are mainly used to verify whether the defined tasks are executed
correctly.
For application tasks, queries can be written that alert the user to com-
promised storage tasks due to certain component vulnerabilities. Examples of
this are Q1.1 and Q1.2. Queries for enforcing invariants are inferred from the
parametric diagrams in SysML, where the modeler defines his invariants. For in-
stance, Q1.3 could be used in an industrial hatchery. The V alue function maps
Table 1. Some queries used for the security analysis of industrial control systems.
Q1. Application task vulnerabilities
Q1.1∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] : CompromisedStorageTask(m,p) ←
StorageTask(m,p) ∧ Contains(x,m) ∧ MemoryWrite(x)
Q1.2∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] : CompromisedStorageTask(m,p) ←
StorageTask(m,p) ∧ Contains(x,m) ∧ Sabotaged(x)
Q1.3(V alue(AlarmS1) = 1) ← (V alue(TempS1) > 40)
Q2. Communication task vulnerabilities
Q2.1∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] n[Module] : CompromisedForwardTask(m,p, n) ←
ForwardTask(m,p, n) ∧ Contains(x,m) ∧ CodeExecution(x)
Q2.2∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] n[Module] : CompromisedForwardTask(m,p, n) ←
ForwardTask(m,p, n) ∧ Contains(x,m) ∧ DoSActive(x)
Q2.3∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] n[Module] lc[LogicalChannel] pc[PhysicalChannel] :
CompromisedForwardTask(m,p, n) ← ForwardTask(m,p, n) ∧ LogicalConnection(m, lc, n) ∧
UsesLink(lc, pc) ∧ DoSActive(pc)
Q2.4∀ x[Component] m[Module] p[Parameter] n[Module] lc[LogicalChannel] c[Component] :
CompromisedForwardTask(m,p, n) ← ForwardTask(m,p, n) ∧ LogicalConnection(m, lc, n) ∧
UsesComponent(lc, c) ∧ DoSActive(c)
Q3. Authentication and authorization task vulnerabilities
Q3.1∀ u[User] s[SystemPart] p[Parameter] : ModifyParameter(u, s, p) ⇒
Permission(u, p, ”Modify”).
Q3.2∀ u[User] c[Configuration] p[Parameter] : (ChangeConfig(u, c) ∧ ConfigAffects(c, p)) ⇒
Permission(u, p, ”Modify”).
type Parameter to type Integer. The query states that an incubator alarm
should be on whenever the temperature in the incubator goes above 40 degrees.
Regarding communication tasks, queries Q2.1 and Q2.2 are two examples of
component vulnerabilities preventing a module m from forwarding its parame-
ter. When a logical channel uses a physical channel that is being attacked, the
communication is affected, this is shown in query Q2.3. Finally, a logical channel
may go through additional components, such as a switch. If these components
are under attack, the communication is also affected, which is expressed in query
Q2.4.
Authentication and authorization tasks make up the largest part of the rules
and queries. For these tasks, the modeler submits a policy specification which
details the permissions that users should have. Queries such as Q3.1 and Q3.2
then check whether the model of the system satisfies the specification.
Table 1 only contains a fraction of the queries in the IDP logic theory, it only
serves to give the user an idea of the kind of feedback that can be extracted.
When IDP evaluates and there are no models that satisfy the queries, it can
be asked to print a minimal subset of the given theory that is unsatisfiable given
the structure. It is shown step by step how a rule in the theory fails. This allows
an operator to identify which vulnerabilities are critical when it comes to sys-
tem security. The printing is achieved by adding the printcore(theory,structure)
command in the main call.
4 Case Study
The case study presented in this article is an industrial brewery. The brewery
is part of the chemical department of the university. It combines cutting-edge
technologies with traditional recipes to produce beer faster than usual, while
reducing energy usage, investment cost, and CO2 emission.
The brewery consists of four tuns and a pump, locally controlled by a PLC.
In the mashing tun, the barley gets mixed with water and the obtained substance
gets heated. The lauter tun is then used to separate the wort. The wort then
gets boiled in the boiling tun. A fourth tun, the hot water tun, is used for the
boiling of water and the preheating of the lauter tun. The pump is used to make
the brew flow from tun to tun.
Each tun has its own sensors and actuators based on its application. For
instance, the mashing tun has a pH meter, a temperature sensor, and four sensors
(empty, low, high, full) to measure the volume. The actuators in the mashing
tun include valves for water and steam, and a stirring mechanism.
The sensors and actuators are connected to a Programmable Logic Controller
(PLC) in an electrical enclosure. A nearby supervision PC is used for controlling
the process. A password is required to access the PC. All control has to be
performed locally on this PC. A historian server is connected to the brewery
network to log the process data.
After the beer is brewed, it is stored in storage tanks in the brewery. The
tanks have sensors to measure the current volume which are also connected to
the PLC.
The operators of the brewery would like to connect their brewery to the
campus network so they can monitor and control the process remotely from their
office workstations. It should also be possible to access the brewery from mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets. However, these changes raise various
security concerns as the campus network is used by thousands of students.
For this case study we will consider three types of user groups with different
permissions. The Operator can monitor and control the process. He can change
parameters such as the temperature and start the brewing process remotely.
Then there are Students who work for the chemistry department and are allowed
to remotely monitor the process, but they are not allowed to modify parameters
or start/stop the brewing. Finally, Attackers are not allowed to read or modify
anything. These could be other students that are not affiliated to the brewery
but have access to the campus network, or outsiders.
For simplicity, we only consider two of the case study parameters in this
article. The pump frequency (PF) and the cooking tun temperature (CTT).
Designing ICS This section explains which extra tasks have to be performed
during the design phase of industrial control systems in order to use our ap-
proach.
In [6], the authors consider four main phases of the ICS life cycle: Design,
Build, Operation, and Decommissioning.
The design phase is further divided in three steps:
- First, an initial concept of the system is created. This has to be approved by
the procurement department before further work can be done.
- The next step is the preliminary design of the ICS. A first risk assessment
is performed on this design.
- Once the preliminary design is approved, the detailed design takes place.
When using our framework, the following additional steps are performed at
the end of the design phase:
- The detailed design of the system is modeled in the Systems Modeling Lan-
guage (SysML). Depending on the design methodology, this may already be
the case.
- A list of simulations is created. Which simulations are included depends on
the system. I.e. if there are components in the system without redundancy,
simulations could be made to figure out what happens if these components
fail.
- For each one of the simulations, the desired outcome is documented. The
modeler considers which results would be acceptable, and which ones would
require changes in the model.
- The base SysML model of the system can now be adapted to run the vari-
ous simulations using the presented approach. The results are observed and
compared with the desired outcome as specified in the previous step. The
model is changed accordingly depending on the results.
Architectures In this section we introduce three different ways of connecting
the brewery to the campus network.
In all architectures, the campus network has a central switch which is con-
nected to a student laptop, an operator laptop, and an access point which allows
remote control from smartphones and laptops.
The brewery network also has a switch which is connected to the various
components. We will now investigate three different set-ups to connect these
two switches.
Architecture 1: Basic Set-up
The first set-up is very basic and will likely never be used in practice. It sim-
ply connects the two switches with each other, merging the networks into one.
This is insecure and will only serve to show how our simulations find certain
vulnerabilities. This architecture is shown in Figure 3.
Architecture 2: RADIUS Server
The second architecture adds an industrial router with a firewall between
the two switches. In order to access the protected network, a user has to provide
the correct password to the router. The router then contacts a RADIUS server
which will tell the router whether to let the user through or not. This RADIUS
Fig. 3. The first architecture.
Server is placed in the campus network. In this architecture, both the student
and the operator possess router credentials as they both require access to the
brewery network in order to perform their operations.
Architecture 3: Demilitarized Zone
Fig. 4. The third architecture.
In this architecture we add a second router to create a Process Informa-
tion Network (PIN) [5]. In this DMZ we place the data historian, the RADIUS
server, and the supervision PC. This ensures that users will never directly access
a component inside the brewery network. The routers require different creden-
tials, students are able to get past the first router and access the historian,
operators can get past both routers and use the supervision PC to control the
process. For added security, it is recommended to use two routers from different
manufacturers, adding defence in depth. Figure 4 shows the architecture.
Results We will run three simulations on these architectures:
- What happens when the operator leaves himself signed in to a workstation
on the campus network?
- What happens when the campus router is compromised?
- What happens when an attacker breaches the RADIUS server used for pass-
word storage?
The simulations will also be run together to observe the effect of combined
attacks on the architectures.
For all three simulations, the desired result is that the policy specification
is satisfied by the system. The operator should always be able to monitor and
control the system, whereas attackers should not have any rights at all. Students
are allowed to read parameters, but not modify them.
Simulation 1: What happens when the operator leaves himself
signed in to a workstation on the campus network?
This simulation only requires a simple change to the input model. Cur-
rently the operator has a token PwOperator assigned to him using a predicate
HasToken(User, T oken). This token grants certain permissions on the process
parameters. It allows to read and modify them. Only the operator should be
able to modify parameters. To simulate what would happen when the operator
leaves himself logged in, it suffices to give this token to other users who are able
to access workstations on the campus network, in this case the student and the
attacker.
When we run this change on the first architecture, both the student and at-
tacker now have the same permissions as the operator, which is a security breach.
The IDP output is shown in IDP Listing 1. IDP has been asked to print out the
CompromisedPermission predicate, which shows students and attackers able
to perform unauthorized operations on system parameters. Afterwards, IDP also
runs the queries on the full model. It shows that no model satisfies the queries,
and returns a trace of a failed query. In this case, it is shown that the student can
modify parameter PF , the pump frequency, whilst this is not in the permission
list. It is possible to print all failed queries but this has not been done for space
reasons.
When we run the simulation on the second architecture, the student gets
operator permissions, but the attacker does not. This is because the industrial
router requires a separate password which only the student and operator have
CompromisedPermission :
{ "Attacker","CTT",Modify; "Attacker","CTT",Read; "Attacker",
"PF",Modify; "Attacker", "PF",Read; "Student","CTT",Modify;
"Student","PF",Modify }
>>> Generating an unsatisfiable subset of the given theory.
>>> Unsatisfiable subset found, trying to reduce its size
(might take some time, can be interruptedwith ctrl-c.
The following is an unsatisfiable subset, given that functions
can map to at most one element (and exactly one if not partial)
and the interpretation of types and symbols in the structure:
((? x[Module] : ModifyParameter("Student",x[Module],"PF"))
=> Permission("Student","PF","Modify")) instantiated from
line 396 with u="Student", z="PF".
Elapsed time to find models : 1.02 sec
IDP Listing 1: The output of the first simulation applied to the first architec-
ture
access to. Hence in the output, the CompromisedPermission predicate only
contains two tuples: (Student, CTT, Modify) and (Student, PF, Modify).
Finally, in the DMZ architecture, neither the student nor the attacker can
get new permissions as neither of them has the password of the second router.
Hence IDP returns an empty predicate and the process finishes without return-
ing an unsatisfiability trace.
Simulation 2: What happens when the campus router is compro-
mised?
Here we assume that an attacker has managed to compromise the campus
router, essentially allowing traffic to flow freely between the networks it connects.
In our input model, this is represented by the SimulateCompromise predicate.
When a component is tagged with this predicate it loses all functionality and
just acts as a node in the network.
This simulation is only performed on architectures two and three, as the first
one does not have a campus router. When the router is compromised in the
second architecture, no compromised permissions are returned. Despite being
able to reach the brewery network, students and attackers still need the operator
password in order to elevate their permissions. Hence, when we combine this
simulation with the previous one, we get the results shown in IDP Listing 1.
Similarly in the third architecture, compromising the router does not result
in any unwanted permissions. However, it allows attackers to access the DMZ,
which is otherwise not possible. When we combine the simulation with the first
one, the result remains the same. Neither the student not the attacker has the
password required to go past the second router and access the brewery network.
Simulation 3: What happens when an attacker breaches the RA-
DIUS server used for password storage?
When a RADIUS server has a component vulnerability, or is improperly con-
figured, it is possible for an attacker to breach the server and obtain some user
credentials, or add his own credentials to the database to gain access. These
credentials will almost always be encrypted or hashed, but for the purpose of
this simulation we assume they are not, or the attacker has access to a power-
ful enough computer to break the hash in reasonable time. The vulnerability is
represented in our input model with the SimulateDataLeakage predicate. ICS
CERT component vulnerabilities that could lead to data leakage include direc-
tory traversal, hardcoded RSA keys, insecure method calls, etc. A component
tagged with this predicate is assumed to leak its data to users who can access
it. In this case the content is the password database.
CompromisedPermission :
{ "Attacker","CTT",Modify; "Attacker","CTT",Read; "Attacker",
"PF",Modify; "Attacker","PF",Read }
>>> Generating an unsatisfiable subset of the given theory.
>>> Unsatisfiable subset found, trying to reduce its size (might
take some time, can be interrupted with ctrl-c.
The following is an unsatisfiable subset, given that functions
can map to at most one element (and exactly one if not partial)
and the interpretation of types and symbols in the structure:
((? x[Module] : ModifyParameter("Attacker",x[Module],"PF")) =>
Permission("Attacker","PF","Modify"))
instantiated from line 392 with u="Attacker", z="PF".
Elapsed time to find models : 0.93 sec
IDP Listing 2: The output of applying simulations 1 and 3 to the second
architecture
This simulation can only be run on the second and third architecture, as
the first one does not have a RADIUS server. In the second architecture, the
RADIUS server is part of the campus network and the attacker has access to it.
When breaching the server, the attacker obtains the password required to enter
the brewery network, or simply adds his own details to the database. This in
itself is not enough to violate any permissions, but when combined with the first
simulation, the attacker can read and modify all parameters, as shown in IDP
Listing 2.
In the third architecture, the attacker does not have access to the RADIUS
server and hence can not exploit the vulnerability. As a result, no compromised
permissions are returned. If we combine simulations two and three, the attacker
is able to access the server and compromise it, gaining access to the brewery
network. If he now obtains the operator password, he can read and modify all
parameters, and we get the same output as in IDP Listing 2.
Table 2. A comparison of simulations on the different architectures. X indicates the
simulation was not run on the architecture. S indicates the student is able to violate
his permissions, A means the same for the attacker.
Architecture 1 Architecture 2 Architecture 3
Simulation 1 S A S
Simulation 2 X
Simulations 1 and 2 X S A
Simulation 3 X
Simulations 1 and 3 X A
Simulations 2 and 3 X
Simulations 1, 2, and 3 X S A A
Table 2 summarises the results of the simulations on the different architec-
tures. It is clear that architecture 3 is the most secure of the three, as it is
vulnerable only when both the router and the RADIUS server are compromised,
and the operator has disclosed his password or left himself logged on. If the
industrial router and RADIUS server are implemented securely, an attacker will
not be able to cause any harm.
5 Reflection
In this section we will reflect on our framework. Amongst other things, we will
look at how easy it is for the modeler to use the framework, how many modeling
steps are automated and how many need to be done manually, what are some
of the drawbacks of our methodology, etc.
The aim of the tool is to run a fully automated security scan based on the
model of an industrial control system. The only user input required is this model.
However, providing this model in IDP is not a trivial task. To make it easier for
the modeler, an extension was done to the framework which allows the modeling
of the system to be done in SysML. This is a lot more intuitive. To use the tool,
the modeler now models their system in SysML, and then it suffices to press
a toolbar button and the security analysis is automatically performed. In that
sense, the tool has achieved its goal of being fully automated.
The quality of the security feedback is another strength of the tool. It is
able to identify complex vulnerabilities which could escape the human eye, as
shown in [13]. It also draws from vast vulnerability databases to quickly identify
component vulnerabilities, which means the user does not have to search through
the databases himself.
To successfully model a system in SysML, some guidelines are still required.
Certain components of our logic theory are not included in SysML by default,
and some workarounds must be done. For example, adding product and version
information to components is done by using SysML comments, as there are no
built-in block properties that allow us to express these concepts. A full user
manual on how to use the framework will be written in the future.
A drawback of the tool is the need for vulnerability database updates. Cur-
rently all vulnerabilities of the ICS-CERT database are automatically inserted in
the IDP structure for every control system that is modeled. This is done by hard-
coding them into the parser which translates the SysML model to IDP input.
When new vulnerabilities are added to the databases, these must be manually
added to the parser program. This is not ideal, ways to automate these updates
are being explored.
Another drawback is that there is currently no set of default attacks or sim-
ulations that the modeler can run on their system. The modeler will have to
model all simulations himself, starting from his original model and performing
the appropriate changes. Always changing the SysML model and then undoing
these changes can be cumbersome. We will look to provide a way of automat-
ically running a fixed set of basic simulations. The user can then still add his
own, more advanced, tests.
A final drawback concerns the feedback of the parser. If the user has wrongly
modeled his control system in SysML, IDP will not be able to evaluate the
resulting input file. Instead of throwing the appropriate warnings or errors, the
system will just crash. The modeler then has to run IDP on the resulting input
file separately through the console in order to get the appropriate error messages.
Ways to help the modeler with debugging will be provided soon.
Finally, to give the reader an idea of the size of the models in this paper,
Table 3 contains the amount of lines of IDP code that are required in the input
models of the various case studies in this paper. In SysML, the brewery case
study consisted of 18 diagrams.
Table 3. Lines of IDP code required to model the case studies. B1 indicates the first
brewery architecture, S1 indicates the first simulation.
Case study IDP lines Case study IDP lines
B1 S1 801 B2 S1 855
B2 S2 861 B2 S3 855
B3 S1 962 B3 S2 967
B3 S3 962
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework that automates the security analysis of indus-
trial control systems. The framework can be used on both operational systems
and systems still in the design phase. The approach uses modeling and formal
reasoning to accomplish its goal. A logic theory in a knowledge-based system
extracts vulnerabilities on a component and system level. The rules in the logic
theory are taken from vulnerability databases and ICS security standards and
guidelines. Once the vulnerabilities are extracted, the user can change the model
accordingly to reason about the effects of component changes or newly intro-
duced vulnerabilities on system security.
The simulations aspect of the framework has been validated on a real case
study: an industrial brewery. It was shown how simulations in our logic frame-
work can be used to reason about different system architectures. Three different
architectures were tested against various simulations, and one architecture came
out as a clear winner. This will now be implemented.
6.1 Future Work
As a next step, the focus could shift to network vulnerabilities. Vulnerability
databases such as NVD and Bugtraq could be included in the logic theory, and
the relevant components could be modeled in more detail to allow extraction of
the vulnerabilities in these databases. Then queries could be written regarding
firewall rules, server management, etc. Another future track could be to focus on
ICS communication protocols such as Modbus, PROFINET, DNP3, etc. Com-
munication links could have the protocol used associated with them, and then
the logic rules could contain known vulnerabilities associated with the different
protocols in order to assess the impact of the chosen protocol on overall security.
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